

Online Appendix for “Assumed Transmission in Political Science”

This methods appendix provides the interested reader with additional information about the data and procedures used in this analysis. The following list details the topics covered in this appendix and the page number on which they are addressed.

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Sources of Trend Data for American Deaths in the World Wars

Compared to the relative ease of locating daily counts of American dead in the three most recent wars, determining trends in American deaths during the two world wars proved challenging. For World War II the only trend data available from government sources are monthly casualty statistics recorded by the U.S. Army. These data exclude losses suffered by Navy and Marine personnel. To fill these gaps, we combed through the entire range of war-related content in the *New York Times* and located every governmental casualty report published during both world wars. Our analysis of World War II uses the *Times* data rather than the Army data for two reasons: early casualties in World War II came disproportionately from the Navy, and Army casualty rates diminished substantially as the European campaign wound down in 1945, while Marines (considered a branch of the Navy) and Naval forces continued to suffer heavy casualties through VJ Day. For World War II, we found 54 casualty reports that included cumulative totals for Army, Navy, and Marine casualties. These reports were published at somewhat regular intervals during the war, covering the period from immediately after December 7, 1941 through August 23, 1945, the date on which casualties from VJ Day (August 15) were publicly announced. These reports were spaced an average of 25 days apart, and from them we interpolated daily casualty totals using the “ipolate” routine in Stata 9.0. We also interpolated daily measures of cumulative American deaths from the official Army statistics, and this series correlates at .993 with the combined Army, Navy, and Marine cumulative deaths interpolated from the *New York Times* reports.

To our knowledge, no trend data on World War I casualties had ever been collected before we undertook this project. For World War I, we found that General Pershing’s official reports of American casualties were typically published several times per week in the *New York Times*. A total of 158 casualty reports were published between October 20, 1917—when the first American casualty of the war was announced—and November 11, 1918. The long delays between when casualties were incurred

and when they were publicly reported meant that by war's end, the American public was aware of only 22,116 of the 116,516 deaths that had occurred among American military forces.¹ About half of the known combat deaths were reported by the *Times* during the last six weeks of the war. We used the same interpolation procedure to produce daily estimates of known combat deaths as was used for *Times* casualty data from World War II.

Details on the Reliability Test for the Content Analysis

Five coders carried out the content analysis after extensive training and reliability testing. A reliability test using 161 stories and conducted prior to the initial data collection effort confirmed that coders were applying the protocol with acceptable levels of agreement and chance-corrected intercoder reliability. After the initial data collection process, a second round of reliability testing was conducted using two coders and all 192 stories that had been coded as mentioning American dead (see Table A1 for complete reliability test results for each variable used in the analysis). For every content variable in the analysis, we calculated either the average and minimum levels of pairwise agreement or the average and minimum pairwise correlations across all combinations of our five coders using PRAM reliability testing software (Neuendorf 2002). Average pairwise agreement across coders ranged from 99% to 87%, and minimum pairwise agreement ranged from 98% to 74%. The likelihood of eventual victory measure had an average pairwise correlation of .80 across coders, and a minimum pairwise correlation of .70. Besides measures of "raw" agreement, we also calculated intercoder reliability statistics, which represent the percent agreement above what can be expected by chance (see the appendix for detailing agreement and intercoder reliability measures for each content variable). For nominal and ordinal variables, the measures of minimum pairwise agreement were used to calculate Brennan and Prediger's kappa (1981), which subtracts a chance agreement term based on the number of coding categories in the

¹ The last of General Pershing's casualty reports was published in early August 1919, with the final casualty figures published in the *Times* on February 8, 1920.

content variable being tested. We also calculated Krippendorff's alpha (2004), which corrects for multiple sources of chance agreement within a covariance framework across multiple coders.² All content variables used in this analysis achieved acceptable levels of intercoder reliability, achieving at least a .70 level of reliability with either kappa or alpha, as appropriate.

To maximize the validity of the content analysis data, we not only tested for chance-corrected intercoder reliability prior to data collection but also randomized the assignment of coders to stories during data collection. Coders were assigned to every fifth story in sequence within each war to ensure that any remaining coding error would distribute randomly across sampled days and that any single day's coding was done by more than one person. As a result, war coverage in 144 of 154 sampled days was analyzed by all five coders (the remaining 10 days had fewer than five war stories to code). Coders were also assigned to begin their analysis in different wars and to proceed in chronological order so that any idiosyncratic errors would distribute evenly across wars. This additional validity check ensures that trends within and across wars are not merely artifacts of the coder assignment process.

Details on the Coding of the Likelihood of Victory Variable

The perceived likelihood of eventual victory is a central variable in the war support literature, but operationalizing this concept from news discourse proved challenging because of its potential relevance to a wide range of cues signaling the progress of a war. Five coding categories were developed to capture different types of information relevant to the likely outcome of a war: the apparent military power of enemy forces, the apparent military power of allied forces, a measure of which side had the military initiative, a measure assessing which side was likely to win the war, and a measure of whether the story contained mostly good news or bad news for the US and its allies. Separate coding variables were collected using these five measures, but a principal components analysis later revealed a single

² To calculate Krippendorff's alpha, we used the "kalphav2_0.sps" SPSS macro developed by Andrew Hayes at Ohio State University.

factor solution with strong loads for all five items (Eigenvalue = 2.86). As a consequence, we scaled all five variables to a common metric (after reverse-coding the enemy strength variable) and averaged them into an aggregated estimate of the war's likely outcome (Cronbach's alpha = .81). This combined measure of the war's anticipated result runs from -1 to 1, with negative values representing an anticipated defeat and positive values indicating a likely victory. The details on each category are detailed below, and we have included coding examples where appropriate.

US/Allied Military Power

Five possible categories: US/Allied very strong; US/Allied somewhat strong; Neither strong nor weak; US/Allied somewhat weak; US/Allied very weak.

We judged the relative strength of the US based on the depiction of the forces in the article. Often, this meant that the strength variable was linked to the outcome variable, although there was not a 1 to 1 correlation between these variables. We coded the strength of forces based on description of the relative size and capabilities of forces as well as the fortitude of the soldiers involved (if the article made special mention of this).

U.S./Allies Very Strong (06/03/1944) – “VAST AIR FLEETS SMASH AT EUROPE. [...] The mighty Allied air fleets struck staggering blows Thursday night, yesterday and last night at numerous points on the edges of Hitler's European fortress, hitting railroads, bridges and radio stations.” This story uses adjectives to qualify the power of the Allied forces as “mighty”. It also highlights that the ample damage in the communication systems is inflicted nearby Hitler's position.

U.S./Allied Somewhat Strong (02/25/1944) - “[...] 8th Loses 49 Bombers Fells 37 of Foe - 15th Bags 29 More. The largest number of planes ever dispatched against Germany pulverized industrial targets in Schweinfurt, Gotha and Steyr, Austria, yesterday when the United States Eighth

Air Force based in Britain and the United States fifteenth Air Force stationed in Italy joined to attack the Reich simultaneously from the west and south.” Whereas this story also portrays a mighty force displayed (comparing it to the former illustration), the difference stems from the fact that in this case losses are reported, namely: 49 bombers in the headlines. Thus, the said report makes a nuance in the report and made this story a candidate for the “somewhat strong” rather than the “very strong” category.

Neither strong nor weak - category was coded when no reference was made to the strength of the Allies.

U.S./Allies somewhat weak (1/16/1941) – “The war in the Mediterranean and upon its shores has entered a new phase, the British communiqué on Monday revealed. For the first time German armed forces have struck a damaging blow against the British in the Mediterranean area.” The story if coded as US/Allies being “somewhat weak” rather than “very weak” due to the fact that German forces were able to inflict damaging blow only for the first time.

U.S./Allies very weak (2/28/1945) “U-BOAT BAD UP, FOE CLAIMS February Sinking Are Said to Total 333,400 Tons. The Germans declare today that increased U-boat warfare and torpedo plane attacks in February sank fifty-seven Allied merchantmen, twenty-seven destroyers and other escorts and two light cruisers.” The Allies are coded as very weak in this story due to the mentioning of only allied losses.

Enemy Military Power

Five possible categories: Enemy very strong; Enemy somewhat strong; Neither strong nor weak; Enemy somewhat weak; Enemy very weak.

The same set of rules originated for the US/Allied Strength apply.

Military Initiative

Five possible categories: US/Allied offensive or operation; US/Allied attack; Stalemate; Enemy Attack; Enemy offensive or operation.

Military initiative was divided into five categories; the key distinction rests on who conducted the action, and how extensive or large the action was. The first check was to determine whether or not one actor clearly conducted an attack. If both enemy and allied forces were conducting military operations, the tone was coded as “stalemate.” Additionally, the absence of any military action was also coded as stalemate.

Once the military actor was established, the article was coded as an offensive or an attack. Offensives or operations consisted of multiple attacks over a wide front, typically involving more than one military unit or multiple branches of the armed forces. Cues such as the nature of the military action, the number of units involved, and whether or not the action took place over a large geographic space were considered when making the offensive/attack distinction. For example, a firefight between two units on a stable front would be coded as an attack, whereas a series of attacks by multiple units across a wide area against an enemy target would be coded as an offensive.

US/Allied Attack (02/13/1915) – “FRENCH RAID AIRSHIP CAMP. Bombs Dropped by Airmen on German Aerodrome in Alsace. [...] Five French aviators dropped bombs today on the

German military aerodrome at Habsheim, a town on the outskirts of Mulhausen, Alsace.” From the text it is clear that the French initiated this military action and that the said action was conducted by a single unit and directed towards a single target.

US/Allied Offensive or Operation (08/27/1914) – “Main Army Headed for Posen [...] the Russian Chief of Staff announces that since Sunday the Russian invasion of Galicia and Prussia has continued uninterruptedly along a wide front.” The text is clear in that Russians initiated an invasion and points out that the said invasion is directed towards two different regions; the operations embrace a “wide front”, thus this is considered an offensive rather than an isolated attack.

Enemy Attack (09/14/1916) – “[...] Thirteen Zeppelin airships took part in the raid over the eastern counties (of London) last night, and an official statement issued this afternoon says it was the most formidable attack by air ever made on England. Only three of the Zeppelins were able to approach the outskirts of London.” The story allows identifying whose initiative the bombardment is and that, though directed to several counties, the said military action has only one target: London. Thus, this story was coded as an attack.

Enemy Offensive or Operation (06/28/1915) – “RUSSIAN ARMIES AGAIN RETREAT. Give Way North and South of Lemberg Under Austro-German Hammering. BAYONET BATTLE IN POLAND. New German Drive at Warsaw After Terrific Artillery Action Met with Cold Steel. [...] The Russians are again retreating in Galicia, both to the north and south of Lemberg, and in Poland the Germans have launched another attack upon Warsaw in the form of a drive from the

north through Przasnysz.” In this case, both the “Austro-German Hammering” and the “New German Drive” suggest a coordinated military action on two different fronts, one in Russia (Galicia – now Ukraine) and one in Poland (Warsaw). Thus, two different units displaying military actions on two different targets made this story a candidate for the “Enemy Offensive” category.

Likely Outcome

Five possible categories: Enemy almost certain to win; Enemy likely to win; No clear likely outcome; US/Allies are likely to win; US/Allies are almost certain to win.

An important distinction had to be made between “almost certain” and “likely to win” categories. Consistent successful attacks and complete surrender of the enemy were treated as “almost certain win.” In several articles, particularly in World War I, there was often no clear victor in a particular battle or campaign. We coded these articles as “No clear likely outcome”. If both sides were making considerable advances and thus each had a clear chance of winning the article was also coded as “No clear likely outcome”.

Enemy almost certain to win (6/28/1915) – “The Russians are again retreating in Galicia, both to the north and south of Limberg, and in Poland the Germans have launched another attack upon Warsaw in the form of a drive from the north though Przasnysz.” This story portrays the Us/Allied forces as consistently retreating whereas German forces continue to launch numerous successful attacks thus qualifying this article as an example of enemy being “almost certain to win”.

Enemy likely to win (8/27/1914) - “Capt. Boy-Ed, naval Attaché of the German Embassy in Washington, who is now temporary stationed in New York, issues a statement yesterday in which he said, among other things, that the German successes in the present war had been belittled: that despite reports to the contrary Liego was in complete German control within six days after the German mobilization was ordered...” This story points out that the success of Germany might have been belittle thus suggesting that the enemy is likely to win. The difference between the previous example stems from the fact that in this present story success of the enemy is reported in only one case.

US/Allies are likely to win (11/18/1915) “[...] In the Adige Valley during the morning of the 14th we enlarged and strengthen the position we occupy on the steep hill which slopes down from Zugna Torta toward Rovereto on the left bank of the leno de Vallersa torrent. The enemy immediately opened a violent artillery fire from Monto Ghella and launched an infantry attack, but was repulsed. In the Paora Valley enemy detachment tried to approach our positions were beaten off, leaving a number of prisoners in our hands.” This story was coded as “US/Allies are likely to win” due to the fact that the enemy did not give up completely, as opposed to the example below, and attempted to launch a number of attacks, although unsuccessful.

US/Allies are almost certain to win (8/27/1914) – “TOGOLAND IS SURRENDED. German Give Up Unconditionally After Asking for Terms. It was announced officially tonight that German Togoland had suffered unconditionally. The Allies will enter Kamina tomorrow morning.” Complete and unconditional withdrawal of German troops in this story indicates that “US/Allies are almost certain to win”.

Good News/Bad News:

Good news/bad news determinations were made from the perspective of the United States and Allied forces. If the news was positive for US and Allied forces, the variable was coded as “good news.” Conversely, negative news was coded “bad news.” If the lead paragraph and headline contained both positive and negative news items, the variable was coded as “a mix of good news and bad news.” Additionally, lead paragraphs and headlines that did not have a clear threshold for positive or negative news fell into the middle category.

We made positive and negative news determinations by studying the immediate gains and losses discussed by the headline and lead paragraph of the article. Thus, the determination was made in the context of the event discussed by the article. If both gains and losses for US and Allied forces were present in the article, the news content was considered “mixed.” For the most part, the short-term focus of the good news/bad news measure, as well as the limited amount of information conveyed by headlines and lead paragraphs, made good news and bad news rare categories.

Mostly Good News (06/27/1966) – “ENEMY NEAR HUE HIT FROM 4 SIDES. 48 of Foe Reported Killed in Diamond-Shaped Area. [...] United States marines and South Vietnamese troops from four sides battered yesterday in a new operation in the marshy flatlands north of Hue.” These headlines and lead paragraph display a unidirectional story: the enemy was under fire and all the losses occurred on their side. Thus, this story is a nice illustration for the “mostly good news” category.

Mix of Good News and Bad News (02/29/1968) – “U.S. REAPPRAISING ITS USE OF TROOPS IN VIETNAM WAR Westmoreland Said to Seek 100,000 to 200,000 More- Wheeler

Briefs Johnson. [...] High Government officials said today that the Johnson Administration was making a reappraisal of American military strategy in Vietnam. The reports came amid indications that Gen. William C. Westmoreland was seeking 100,000 to 200,000 more troops for the war effort.” These headlines and lead paragraph do not convey the sense of clarity the former illustration provides. In this case, the “reappraisal” part of the story can be taken as bad news, however the consideration of sending more troops can be interpreted as both good and bad news. Therefore, this story is a nice illustration for the “mixed news” category.

Mostly Bad News (08/18/1964) – “VIETCONG BATTER 2 HAMLETS AND AMUSH RELIEF FORCE. South Vietnam Casualties at 117 in One of the Worst Setbacks in Weeks. [...] A pro-Communist battalion smashed two Government posts in the Mekong River delta late yesterday, ambushed a relief force and inflicted 117 casualties in Government troops.” This story, at the other end of the spectrum, is also a unidirectional story: the enemy, the Vietcong, inflicted all the pain without any reported losses (at least neither in the headlines nor in the lead paragraph) on their side. This is a clear example of a “mostly bad news” category.


Alternative Modeling of Casualty Coverage

The first three tables model the appearance of casualties in individual news stories, showing models for individual wars as well as the pooled models that combine wars. The dependent variable in Tables A2-A4 is whether or not an individual story mentioned American casualties. The pooled models in Table A2 are the same as those reported the paper's Table 1, except with coefficients shown for the war-specific dummy variables (these coefficients were omitted from the paper's Table 1). Table A3 shows the models with story-level rather than day-level variables. Table A4 represents a combined model with both story and day variables included. This model is affected by the collinearity between story and day level variables regarding tone and content, but it still returns the same basic findings as in the other models. The dependent variable in Table A5 is the proportion of stories within each day containing mentions of American casualties, broken down by individual wars. The dependent variable in Table A6 is whether American deaths are mentioned at all on a given day (1 = mentioned, 0 = not mentioned). Taken together, these tables demonstrate that the findings reported in the paper generally hold for individual wars modeled separately from the others, although the smaller number of observations in these war-specific models (which are individual stories in Tables A2-A4 and sampled days in Table A5) means that these relationships sometimes fail to attain conventional levels of statistical significance when the wars are modeled separately. More generally, the alternative specifications in Tables A2-A5 all support the same conclusions as those reported in the paper, demonstrating that our findings are robust to different modeling choices (measuring casualty mentions at the story-level versus day-level; using story-level controls for combat descriptions and eventual likelihood of victory versus day-level measures only, etc.).

References

- Brennan, Robert L., and Dale J. Prediger. 1981. Coefficient kappa: Some uses, misuses, and alternatives. *Educational and Psychological Measurement* 41:687-699.
- Krippendorff, Klaus. 2004. *Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology*. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Neuendorf, Kimberly A. 2002. *The content analysis guidebook*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Figure A1
 Cumulative Number of American War Deaths



Note: The dotted line for World War I represents cumulative casualties reported after the end of hostilities.

Figure A2
American War Deaths during the Previous 120 Days



Table A1: Intercoder Reliability Statistics for Content Variables Used in the Analysis

	Type (# of Categories)	Average Pairwise Agreement/Correlation	Minimum Pairwise Agreement/Correlation	Brennan and Prediger's kappa ^a	Krippendorff's alpha ^b
Mentions American Dead _c	Nominal (2)	91.2%	86.8%	.736	.708
Mentions Cumulative US Dead _d	Nominal (2)	91.7%833	.721
Mentions Numeric Trends in US Dead _d	Nominal (2)	97.4%948	.814
Mentions Combat Operations _c	Nominal (2)	86.5%	74.2%	.484	.738
Likelihood of Victory _c	Interval	.797	.704771

^a Intercoder reliability calculated from minimum pairwise agreement

^b Intercoder reliability measured as chance-corrected covariance

^c Each cell reports results based on parallel coding across five coders of all 161 stories included in the initial reliability test.

^d Each cell reports results based on parallel coding across two coders of all 192 stories mentioning American dead.

Table A2. Predicting Mentions of American Deaths in War-Related Newspaper Stories Using Only Day-Level Victory and Combat Variables

	Models for Separate Wars					Pooled Models		
	WWI	WWII	Korea	Vietnam	Iraq	All Wars	WWI and WWII	Korea, Vietnam, Iraq
Elapsed Time Since Start Of U.S. Involvement (Years)	3.12† (1.78)	.62 (.42)	-.17 (.31)	-.06 (.06)	.07 (.16)	-.05 (.05)	.64* (.32)	-.06 (.05)
Marginal # Of U.S. Deaths In Past 30 Days (100s)	-.044 (.054)	-.002 (.005)	-.004 (.032)	.001 (.024)	.98 (.71)	.004† (.002)	-.003 (.004)	-.008 (.016)
Trend In Marginal American Deaths (-1, 0, +1)	-1.67 (1.43)	.12 (.24)	-.20 (.30)	.10 (.15)	-.41 (.28)	.04 (.09)	.09 (.19)	.04 (.10)
Daily Average Likelihood Of Victory (-1 - +1)	-1.13 (6.63)	-5.24 (4.07)	-1.37 (3.13)	-3.57 (2.17)	-4.97* (1.80)	-3.14* (.89)	-3.89† (2.05)	-3.44* (1.07)
Daily Proportion Of Stories Describing Combat Ops (0-1)	2.36 (4.27)	-2.51 (2.26)	1.31 (2.57)	1.47 (1.04)	7.59* (2.15)	1.50* (.66)	-2.47 (1.60)	2.42* (.72)
WWII						-75* (.35)	-75† (.40)	
Korea						-46 (.40)		
Vietnam						-03 (.33)		.41 (.32)
Iraq						.46 (.35)		.85* (.34)
Constant	-12.46* (5.37)	-3.40* (1.44)	-2.38* (.66)	-2.14* (.45)	-3.76* (.96)	-2.18* (.41)	-2.91* (1.15)	-2.72* (.36)
Log Likelihood	-49.4	-157.2	-63.6	-184.7	-166.8	-637.0*	-209.3*	-419.9*
Pseudo R2	.05	.04	.01	.02	.06	.05	.04	.04
N =	160	737	214	509	357	1977	897	1080

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$

Note: cells contain logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A3. Predicting Mentions of American Deaths in War-Related Newspaper Stories Using Only Story-Level Victory and Combat Variables

	Models for Separate Wars					Pooled Models		
	WWI	WWII	Korea	Vietnam	Iraq	All Wars	WWI and WWII	Korea, Vietnam, Iraq
Elapsed Time Since Start Of U.S. Involvement (Years)	3.59† (1.87)	.08 (.28)	-.14 (.29)	-.04 (.07)	-.01 (.14)	-.03 (.05)	.28 (.26)	-.04 (.06)
Marginal # Of U.S. Deaths In Past 30 Days (100s)	-.046 (.031)	.002 (.004)	.004 (.027)	.014 (.026)	-.59 (.49)	.003 (.002)	-.000 (.004)	-.008 (.016)
Trend In Marginal American Deaths (-1, 0, +1)	-1.85 (1.48)	-.14 (.20)	-.24 (.29)	.18 (.16)	.20 (.19)	.01 (.09)	-.06 (.18)	.04 (.10)
Story-Level Likelihood Of Victory (-1 - +1)	-2.40* (.91)	-.94* (.41)	-.06 (.87)	-.61 (.56)	-2.77* (.72)	-1.24* (.25)	-1.24* (.37)	-1.33* (.37)
Story Describes Combat Ops (1, 0)	1.44* (.58)	1.01* (.33)	.45 (.54)	2.56* (.31)	1.25* (.35)	1.52* (.16)	1.10* (.28)	1.72* (.20)
WWII						-.80* (.36)	-.89* (.41)	
Korea						-.14 (.40)		
Vietnam						.36 (.31)		.50 (.33)
Iraq						.96* (.32)		1.03* (.34)
Constant	-13.72* (5.67)	-3.73* (.98)	-2.33* (.58)	-2.90* (.41)	-1.43* (.50)	-2.72* (.35)	-3.49* (.94)	-2.82* (.33)
Log Likelihood	-43.4*	-156.5	-63.4	-149.7*	-160.7*	-594.2*	-203.2*	-388.3*
Pseudo R2	.01	.05	.01	.21	.09	.11	.07	.11
N=	160	737	214	509	357	1977	897	1080

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$

Note: cells contain logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4. Predicting Mentions of American Deaths in War-Related Newspaper Stories Using Both Day- and Story-Level Victory and Combat Variables

	Models for Separate Wars					Pooled Models		
	WWI	WWII	Korea	Vietnam	Iraq	All Wars	WWI and WWII	Korea, Vietnam, Iraq
Elapsed Time Since Start Of U.S. Involvement (Years)	3.44† (1.90)	.65 (.42)	-.17 (.30)	-.06 (.07)	.08 (.16)	-.04 (.05)	.68* (.32)	-.06 (.06)
Marginal # Of U.S. Deaths In Past 30 Days (100s)	-.053 (.057)	-.002 (.005)	-.004 (.032)	.005 (.026)	.974 (.739)	.004* (.002)	-.003 (.004)	-.010 (.016)
Trend In Marginal American Deaths (-1, 0, +1)	-1.82 (1.53)	.13 (.24)	-.20 (.30)	.12 (.17)	-.41 (.29)	.04 (.09)	.11 (.20)	.04 (.10)
Daily Average Likelihood Of Victory (-1 - +1)	1.55 (7.11)	-4.68 (4.15)	-1.43 (3.31)	-4.27 (2.63)	-2.70 (1.96)	-2.08* (.97)	-3.01 (2.11)	-2.53* (1.22)
Story-Level Likelihood Of Victory (-1 - +1)	-2.42* (.92)	-.73† (.42)	.05 (.92)	-.14 (.61)	-2.78* (.78)	-1.03* (.27)	-1.06* (.38)	-1.00* (.40)
Daily Proportion Of Stories Describing Combat Ops (0-1)	1.15 (4.56)	-3.81 (2.32)	.88 (2.65)	-1.53 (1.23)	6.76* (2.26)	-.20 (.72)	-3.76* (1.66)	.59 (.80)
Story Describes Combat Ops (1, 0)	1.44* (.59)	1.27* (.34)	.41 (.56)	2.75* (.33)	1.06* (.36)	1.56* (.17)	1.27* (.29)	1.70* (.21)
WWII						-.80* (.36)	-.77† (.41)	
Korea						-.42 (.42)		
Vietnam						.03 (.34)		.44 (.33)
Iraq						.59 (.37)		.94* (.35)
Constant	-13.83* (5.72)	-3.65* (1.47)	-2.38 (.67)	-2.61* (.52)	-3.95* (1.00)	-2.39* (.43)	-3.21* (1.18)	-2.89* (.38)
Log Likelihood	-43.3*	-149.3*	-63.3	-146.7*	-155.9*	-591.2*	-196.9*	-386.1*
Pseudo R2	.17	.09	.01	.22	.12	.12	.10	.12
N =	160	737	214	509	357	1977	897	1080

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$

Note: cells contain logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A5. Predicting the Daily Proportion (0-1) of War-Related Stories Mentioning American Deaths

	Models for Separate Wars					Pooled Models		
	WWI	WWII	Korea	Vietnam	Iraq	All Wars	WWI and WWII	Korea, Vietnam, Iraq
Elapsed Time Since Start Of U.S. Involvement (Years)	.24* (.09)	.02 (.02)	-.01 (.04)	-.01 (.01)	-.02 (.03)	-.01 (.01)	.04 (.02)	-.01 (.01)
Marginal # Of U.S. Deaths In Past 30 Days (100s)	-.004 (.003)	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.004)	-.003 (.004)	.25† (.13)	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.003 (.002)
Trend In Marginal American Deaths (-1, 0, +1)	-.14 (.07)	-.00 (.01)	-.02 (.03)	.02 (.02)	-.09† (.05)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.01 (.02)
Daily Average Likelihood Of Victory (-1 - +1)	-.02 (.33)	-.16 (.17)	-.01 (.35)	-.69* (.27)	-1.11* (.40)	-.47* (.14)	-.25* (.11)	-.63* (.19)
Daily Proportion Of Stories Describing Combat Ops (0-1)	.35 (.26)	-.13 (.10)	-.05 (.26)	.30* (.13)	1.21* (.38)	.27* (.09)	-.05 (.09)	.32* (.11)
WWII						-.06 (.06)	-.07 (.02)	
Korea						-.07 (.06)		
Vietnam						.01 (.05)		.06 (.05)
Iraq						.05 (.06)		.08 (.05)
Constant	-.74* (.26)	.06 (.07)	.12 (.09)	.13* (.06)	-.18 (.16)	.12† (.06)	.05 (.07)	.07 (.05)
R2	.77	.38	.06	.30	.41	.27	.42	.27
N =	10	20	18	49	29	125	30	95

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$

Note: cells contain unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A6. Predicting Days in Which At Least One War-Related Story Mentioned American Deaths

	Pooled Models		
	All Wars	WWI and WWII	Korea, Vietnam, Iraq
Elapsed Time Since Start Of U.S. Involvement (Years)	-.14 (.16)	-.40 (1.73)	-.14 (.17)
Marginal # Of U.S. Deaths In Past 30 Days (100s)	.03 (.02)	.05 (.07)	.02 (.06)
Trend In Marginal American Deaths (-1, 0, +1)	.56† (.29)	-.14 (.89)	.62† (.32)
Daily Average Likelihood Of Victory (-1 - +1)	-5.94* (2.97)	-4.63 (7.87)	-5.90† (3.42)
Daily Proportion Of Stories Describing Combat Ops (0-1)	-3.42† (1.91)	-7.27 (6.22)	-2.96 (2.11)
WWII	-.71 (1.35)	-1.56 (1.89)	
Korea	-2.57* (1.30)		
Vietnam	-1.48 (1.27)		1.06 (.87)
Iraq	-2.11 (1.38)		.37 (.90)
Constant	4.39* (1.47)	6.88 (5.48)	1.83† (.96)
Log Likelihood	-50.6*	-9.8	-40.3*
Pseudo R2	.17	.27	.15
N =	125	30	95

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$

Note: cells contain logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Separate models for individual wars are not reported due to overdetermination caused by the truncated dependent variable and the small number of cases.